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ABSTRACT
During the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020,
President Trump touted a number of treatments that many medical
professionals considered dangerous. These treatments include
hydroxychloroquine and disinfectants, which if misused could
cause a patient’s death. This prompted Free Press to file an
emergency petition with the FCC, arguing that broadcasters who
report on Trump’s claims about these treatments without
highlighting their dangers could be in violation of the
Commission’s broadcast hoax rule. Free Press also requested the
FCC require that broadcasters include disclaimers when reporting
on such claims. This article examines whether the broadcast hoax
rule has been violated here, and whether such disclaimers should
be required. The preferred approach under the First Amendment is
to leave it to the marketplace of ideas to ascertain the truth of
Trump’s statements. This article ultimately concludes that the
broadcast hoax rule is a poor fit for this case and that requiring
disclaimers could chill broadcast coverage of the COVID-19
pandemic, leaving the public less informed about this important
public health issue. Counterspeech, or providing accurate
information to help counteract false statements, is the preferable
approach here.
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INTRODUCTION
In early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic swept the world,
leaving government and medical officials seeking ways to treat and
slow the spread of the disease. In March of that year, U.S.
President Donald Trump, in one of many daily press briefings on
COVID-19, touted the drugs hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine
as potentially effective treatments in the fight against COVID-19.1
This was in conflict with the thinking of many health officials, who
were concerned about misuse of the drugs and the potential harm
that could result.2 Following Trump’s statement, the Food and
1

Ken Alltucker & Elizabeth Weise, US Coronavirus Cases Top 11,000,
Trump Touts Two Potential 'Exciting' Treatments, USA TODAY (March 19,
2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2020/03/19/trump-toutschloroquine-remdesevir-possible-coronavirus-treatments/2875965001/;
Elizabeth Weise, Study of Trump-Touted Chloroquine for Coronavirus Stopped
Due to Heart Problems, Deaths, USA TODAY (April 15, 2020,)
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2020/04/15/coronavirus-chloroquine-testhalted-drug/2983129001/.
2
Oliver Milman, Trump Touts Hydroxychloroquine as a Cure for Covid-19,
THE
GUARDIAN
(April
6,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2020/apr/06/coronavirus-cure-fact-check-
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Drug Administration (FDA) warned that the two drugs had “not
been shown to be safe and effective for treating or preventing
COVID-19” and that their use could result in health problems,
even death. 3
Trump’s statement regarding hydroxychloroquine and
chloroquine was but one of a number of inaccurate or misleading
statements he had made concerning COVID-19 and its effects.4
Among those concerned about Trump’s promotion of potentially
dangerous drugs was Free Press, an organization aimed at
promoting Internet and press freedom.5 Free Press asserted that
broadcast news outlets have a responsibility to inform the public of
the potential inaccuracy of Trump’s statements when covering or
discussing them. Otherwise, said Free Press, broadcasters could be
responsible for the harm that results to those who believe and act
on those statements. 6 Free Press pointed to Trump’s promotion of
chloroquine phosphate to treat COVID-19, as well as his March 19
statement, “[Hydroxychloroquine has] been around for a long time,
so we know if things don’t go as planned it's not going to kill
anybody…. It’s shown very, very encouraging early results….”7
Free Press alleged that the broadcast of statements such as these
hydroxychloroquine-trump.
3
Annie Karni & Katie Thomas, Trump Says He’s Taking
Hydroxychloroquine, Prompting Warning From Health Experts, N.Y. TIMES
(May 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/us/politics/trumphydroxychloroquine-covid-coronavirus.html?referringSource=articleShare; see
also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA DRUG SAFETY COMMUNICATION: FDA
CAUTIONS AGAINST USE OF HYDROXYCHLOROQUINE OR CHLOROQUINE FOR
COVID-19 (May 24, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/137250/download.
4
See, e.g., A Guide to Our Coronavirus Coverage, FACTCHECK.ORG,
https://www.factcheck.org/a-guide-to-our-coronavirus-coverage/ (last visited
May 30, 2020).
5
Free Press, Media Kit, https://www.freepress.net/news/media-kit (last
visited May 30, 2020).
6
Free Press, Emergency Petition for Inquiry into Broadcast of False
Information
on
COVID-19
,
at
2-7,
https://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/202003/free_press_petition_for_inquiry_to_fcc_re_broadcast_misinformation.pdf
[hereinafter Free Press Petition].
7
Id. at 3-4 (citing CSPAN (@cspan), TWITTER (Mar. 19, 2020, 12:10 PM),
https://twitter.com/cspan/status/1240672025989001221 (emphasis added)).
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“precipitated the death of an Arizona man and hospitalization of
his wife … when they ingested the drug because they said they had
‘watched televised briefings during which President Trump talked
about the potential benefits of chloroquine’ and believed it was
safe because ‘it was all over TV.’” 8
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ruled on
the Free Press petition before Trump made additional statements
about potential treatments for COVID-19 that the organization
would likely have found even more troublesome in their potential
to cause harm. In May, Trump claimed to be taking
hydroxychloroquine on a regular basis as a preventative measure
against COVID-19,9 despite the FDA’s warnings against such use
of the drug.10 In fact, Trump falsely claimed that the FDA issued
no such warning.11 Observers were concerned “not just of the
dangers it posed for the president’s health but also of the example
it set.”12
Trump then touted yet another potentially dangerous
8

Id. at 3 (citing David Armstrong, Ava Kofman, & Topher Sanders,
Doctors Are Hoarding Unproven Coronavirus Medicine by Writing
Prescriptions for Themselves and Their Families, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://www.propublica.org/article/doctors-are-hoarding-unprovencoronavirusmedicine-by-writing-prescriptions-for-themselves-and-their-families;
Erika
Edwards & Vaughn Hillyard, Man Dies After Taking Chloroquine in an Attempt
to
Prevent
Coronavirus,
NBC
NEWS
(Mar.
23,
2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/man-dies-after-ingestingchloroquine-attempt-prevent-coronavirus-n1167166). See also Daniel Brooks,
Banner Health Experts Warn Against Self-Medicating to Prevent or Treat
COVID-19,
BANNER
HEALTH
(March
23,
2020),
http://bannerhealth.mediaroom.com/chloroquinephosphate
(the
couple
apparently ingested a similar-sounding ingredient, chloroquine phosphate, as a
result)
9
See Nikki Carvajal & Kevin Liptak, Trump Says He Is Taking
Hydroxychloroquine Though Health Experts Question Its Effectiveness, CNN
(May 19, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/18/politics/donald-trumphydroxychloroquine-coronavirus/index.html.
10
Id.
11
Daniel Dale, Fact Check: Trump Falsely Denies FDA Warning on
Hydroxychloroquine, Baselessly Alleges Political Bias in Study, CNN (May 20,
2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/19/politics/fact-check-trumphydroxychloroquine-study/index.html.
12
Karni & Thomas, supra note 3.
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treatment for the virus. In April, Trump discussed using
disinfectants to treat COVID-19, stating, “and then I see the
disinfectant, where it knocks it out in a minute. One minute. And is
there a way we can do something like that, by injection inside or
almost a cleaning. Because you see it gets in the lungs and it does a
tremendous number on the lungs.”13 This prompted a reaction from
medical and government officials warning against the use of
disinfectants to treat the disease due to the associated potential
dangers, including, again, death. Even the makers of Clorox and
Lysol responded with warnings urging against the ingestion or
injection of their products.14
The warnings were warranted. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention reported an increase in calls to poison
control centers involving exposure to disinfectants following
Trump’s statement. 15 Within 18 hours of the statement, New York
City’s Department of Health and Mental Hygiene saw a similar
increase in calls.16 A Maryland health hotline received so many
calls with questions about the use of disinfectants to treat the
disease that the state’s Emergency Management Agency issued “a
warning that ‘under no circumstances’ should any disinfectant be
taken to treat COVID-19.” 17 Illinois’ Department of Public Health
issued a similar warning after a person tried to gargle mouthwash
mixed with bleach. 18 Overall, the American Association of Poison
13

User Clip: Trump on Injecting Disinfectant, C-SPAN (April 23, 2020),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4871089/user-clip-trump-injecting-disinfectant.
14
Maggie Haberman, Christine Hauser, Katie Rogers & Alan Yuhas,
Trump’s Suggestion That Disinfectants Could Be Used to Treat Coronavirus
Prompts Aggressive Pushback, N.Y. TIMES (April 24, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/us/politics/trump-inject-disinfectantbleach-coronavirus.html; John Bowden, Accidental Poisonings from Bleach and
Other Disinfectants Spiked amid Coronavirus, THE HILL (May, 12, 2020,
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/497312-accidental-poisonings-from-bleachand-other-disinfectants-spiked-amid.
15
Id.; see also Aris Folley, Calls to Poison Control Centers Spike after
Trump
Disinfectant
Comments,
THE HILL
(April
26,
2020),
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/494744-poison-control-centers-reportincrease-in-calls-pertaining-to-exposure-to.
16
Id.
17
Haberman, Hauser, Rogers & Yuhas, supra note 14.
18
Folley, supra note 15.
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Control Centers reported a surge in “the number of calls to poison
control hotlines regarding accidental poisoning from household
cleaners and disinfectants” in April 2020 to more than double those
of April 2019. 19
The timing of this suggests that Trump’s touting of
potentially dangerous treatments for COVID-19 has led some to
try those treatments, endangering the health and well-being of
those who do. In its emergency petition to the FCC, Free Press also
put some of the blame for this on broadcast television stations that
provided “context-less coverage” of Trump’s press conferences
and inaccurate statements. 20 According to Free Press, the coverage
of this this disinformation resulted in “substantial public harm,”
including the death of the Arizona man discussed previously.21
Free Press alleged that broadcasters who cover or repeat
statements such as those Trump made about the efficacy of
hydroxychloroquine without including disclaimers about the
accuracy of the statements, could be in violation of the FCC’s
broadcast hoax rule.22 The broadcast hoax rule allows the FCC to
sanction broadcast television and radio stations that air false
information in certain circumstances. One way that broadcasters
can avoid violating the rule is to air disclaimers that the
information presented is false or fictional. 23 This led Free Press to
urge the FCC to formally recommend that “broadcasters
prominently disclose when information they air is false or
scientifically suspect,” even if the broadcaster is simply reporting
on the president’s statements. 24 Said Free Press, “When the
president tells dangerous lies about a public health emergency,
broadcasters have a choice: don’t air them, or put those lies in
context with disclaimers noting that they may be untrue and are
19

Bowden, supra note 14.
Free Press Petition, supra note 6, at 2.
21
Id. at 3.
22
Id. at 1-4.
23
See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217 (2019). The disclaimers that Free Press pointed
to are in the provision of the rule which provides that “[a]ny programming
accompanied by a disclaimer will be presumed not to pose foreseeable harm if
the disclaimer clearly characterizes the program as a fiction and is presented in a
way that is reasonable under the circumstances.”
24
Free Press Petition, supra note 6, at 7.
20
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unverified.”25
Responding to the Free Press petition, the FCC observed
that the request would require a “novel” and “expand[ed]”
construction of the broadcast hoax rule, noting that that
construction “could apply far more broadly” than requested in the
current case. 26 It also stated that the request “misconstrues the
Commission’s rules and seeks remedies that would dangerously
curtail the freedom of the press embodied in the First
Amendment.”27 Accordingly, the FCC denied the Free Press
petition, “both because the broadcast hoax rule does not support
such a reading and because the relief requested raises significant
First Amendment concerns.” 28
While the FCC declined to involve itself here, the Free
Press petition does raise the questions of whether there is a role for
the FCC to play with regard to broadcasters that provide inaccurate
or misleading information in their coverage of Trump’s statements
about COVID-19. As Free Press pointed out, the broadcast hoax
rule does allow the FCC to punish broadcasters that air false
information in certain circumstances. 29 Could the FCC use the rule
to help stop the spread of misinformation about COVID-19? And
should the FCC require broadcasters to air disclaimers about the
potential inaccuracy of Trump’s statements?
To answer those questions, Part II examines the
circumstances leading up to the FCC’s adoption of the broadcast
hoax rule. Part III then discusses each of the rule’s requirements,
as well as the FCC’s reasoning for including those requirements in
the rule. In addition, each of those requirements are examined in
conjunction with the coverage of Trump’s misinformation about
treating COVID-19. Part IV then analyzes the application of the
broadcast hoax rule in this situation, concluding that the rule is a
25

Id.
Letter from Michelle M. Carey, Chief, Media Bureau and Thomas M.
Johnson, Jr., General Counsel, to Jessica J. González and Gaurav Laroia, Free
Press, Federal Communications Commission, DA 20-385, April 6, 2020, at 3,
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-20-385A1.pdf
[hereinafter FCC
Response].
27
Id. at 1.
28
Id. at 3.
29
Free Press Petition, supra note 6, at 2-3.
26
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poor fit for these circumstances. Part V analyzes the First
Amendment implications of requiring disclaimers in broadcast
news coverage of Trump’s inaccurate statements as requested by
Free Press, concluding that such a requirement would likely be
unconstitutional. Part VI then considers the implication of the
rule’s limitation to broadcast media. In Part VII, the article
concludes that the FCC should not seek to apply the broadcast
hoax rule in the manner urged by Free Press, but should rather rely
on the marketplace of ideas to provide counterspeech to counteract
the harms resulting from Trump’s disinformation. Otherwise,
broadcasters may be chilled in providing information about
COVID-19, leaving the public potentially less informed about the
virus than they otherwise would be.
At the outset, it should be noted that there is a significant
limitation on the FCC’s use of the broadcast hoax rule, in that the
applies only to broadcasters, which means TV and radio stations. It
does not apply to cable news networks, such as FOX News or
CNN. 30 Nor does the rule apply to newspapers or websites.31 This
stems from the fact that broadcasters are licensed by the FCC to
use a scarce public resource: the electromagnetic spectrum, which
is used for all forms of wireless communication.32 Because of “the
unique physical limitations of the broadcast medium,” there are
fewer frequencies available for broadcast television and radio
stations than there is demand for them, a concept known as
“scarcity.”33 The Supreme Court has offered the following
explanation of scarcity and its implication for the First Amendment
rights of broadcasters:
30

See, e.g., FCC Response supra note 26 at 3, n.19.
See, e.g., What We Do, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/what-we-do (last visited May 30, 2020); Michael
O’Rielly, FCC Regulatory Free Arena, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
(June
1,
2018),
https://www.fcc.gov/newsevents/blog/2018/06/01/fcc-regulatory-free-arena.
32
See, e.g., What Is Spectrum? A Brief Explainer, CTIA (June 5, 2018),
https://www.ctia.org/news/what-is-spectrum-a-brief-explainer.
33
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994)
(citing FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-389, 396-399 (1969);
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943)).
31
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As a general matter, there are more would-be
broadcasters than frequencies available in the
electromagnetic spectrum. And if two broadcasters were to
attempt to transmit over the same frequency in the same
locale, they would interfere with one another’s signals, so
that neither could be heard at all. The scarcity of broadcast
frequencies thus required the establishment of some
regulatory mechanism to divide the electromagnetic
spectrum and assign specific frequencies to particular
broadcasters. In addition, the inherent physical limitation
on the number of speakers who may use the broadcast
medium has been thought to require some adjustment in
traditional First Amendment analysis to permit the
Government to place limited content restraints, and impose
certain affirmative obligations, on broadcast licensees. As
we said in Red Lion, “where there are substantially more
individuals who want to broadcast than there are
frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable
First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right
of every individual to speak, write, or publish.”34
Thus, scarcity allows for greater government regulation of
broadcast speech than of speech in other forms of media. One way
that broadcast speech is regulated that speech in other forms of
media is not is that broadcast TV and radio stations, and they
alone, are subject to the FCC’s broadcast hoax rule.
I. REASONS FOR ENACTMENT OF THE BROADCAST HOAX RULE
Despite having some ability to do so, as a general matter,
the FCC is reluctant to involve itself in a review of broadcast
program content, particularly news. There are statutory and
34
Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 637-38 (citations omitted). It has been
argued that the scarcity rationale “should be overruled because the rationale . . .
has been overtaken by technological change and the wide availability of
multiple other choices for listeners and viewers.” Fox v. FCC, 567 U.S. 239, 258
(2012) (citations omitted). The Court, however, has so far declined to do this.
See id. (“These arguments need not be addressed here.”)
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constitutional reasons for this. As the FCC has observed, “Section
326 of the Act prohibits the Commission from censoring radio
communications, and the First Amendment to the Constitution
strictly limits the Commission’s authority to interfere with the
programming decisions of licensees.”35 Because of this, the FCC
has stated that its “role in overseeing program content is very
limited.” 36
Despite its reluctance to involve itself in reviews of
program content, in 1991, the FCC proposed adopting the
broadcast hoax rule because “serious broadcast hoaxes have
occurred where the stations involved fabricated stories concerning
a crime or catastrophe that alarmed the public and resulted in the
needless diversion of public safety or law enforcement
resources.”37 These “fabricated stories” include a radio station
falsely airing a warning that the U.S. was under nuclear attack, 38 a
radio station falsely reporting that an on-air host had been shot in
the head in the station parking lot, 39 a radio station’s false report
of a nearby volcanic eruption, 40 and a morning radio show on
which the hosts orchestrated a false murder confession from a
caller to the show. 41
In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the broadcast
hoax rule, the FCC expressed its belief “that certain types of
broadcast hoaxes are so potentially harmful that they are

35

TVT License, Inc., 22 FCC Rcd. 13,591, ¶ 17 (2007) (citing 47 U.S.C. §
326, U.S. Const., amend. I).
36
FCC Response, supra note 26, at 2 (citing FCC, THE PUBLIC AND
BROADCASTING 7 (August 2019), https://www.fcc.gov/media/radio/publicand-broadcasting) (quotations omitted).
37
Amendment of Part 73 Regarding Broad. Hoaxes, Report and Order
(Proceeding Terminated), 7 FCC Rcd. 4106, ¶ 2 (1992) [hereinafter Broadcast
Hoax Report & Order].
38
See FCC Response, supra note 26, at 2-3.
39
Broadcast Hoax Report & Order, supra note 37, at n.1 (citing Letter to
WALE-AM, 7 FCC Rcd 2345 (MMB 1992)). See also FCC Response, supra
note 26, at 2-3.
40
Broadcast Hoax Report & Order, supra note 37, at n.1 (citing Letter to
WCCC-AM/FM, (MMB, dated July 26, 1990)).
41
Id. (citing Letter to KROQ-FM, 6 FCC Rcd 7262 (1991)). See also FCC
Response, supra note 26, at 2-3.
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inconsistent with the public interest.”42 Under its then-existing
policies, the Commission had only two options to take against
broadcasters who aired hoaxes such as these: it “can either issue a
letter of admonition, which may be considered on renewal or sale
of the station or, in extreme cases, it can revoke a station’s
license.” 43 The broadcast hoax rule would offer the FCC a choice
between these two extremes, in that the rule would allow the
Commission to fine stations for violations.44 This option would be
“less drastic than license revocation or non-renewal, but [have]
more deterrence value than admonition.”45
The FCC was mindful of crafting a rule that would address
its concerns about hoaxes with the potential to cause harm without
overly burdening broadcasters’ First Amendment rights or unduly
chilling broadcast speech.46 In this vein, the FCC stated that it was
not seeking “to address harmless pranks, or to deter broadcasts that
might upset some listeners but do not pose a substantial threat to
public health and safety.”47 As an example, the FCC did not intend
the rule to cover “incidents such as the April Fool’s joke
perpetrated recently by a station, which announced that one of the
stars of the city’s National Football League team had been traded.
While this prank undoubtedly distressed some football fans, it is
our intent to focus instead on a narrow category of cases that
present the potential for substantial public harm.”48
II. THE BROADCAST HOAX RULE AND ITS APPLICATION
In 1992, the FCC adopted the broadcast hoax rule, which
states:
No licensee or permittee of any broadcast station shall
Amendment of Part 73 of the FCC’s Rules Regarding Broad. Hoaxes,
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 6 FCC Rcd. 6935, ¶ 1 (1991) [hereinafter
Broadcast Hoax NPRM].
43
Broadcast Hoax Report & Order, supra note 37, at ¶ 2.
44
Id.
45
Id. at ¶ 18.
46
Broadcast Hoax NPRM, supra note 42, at ¶ 1.
47
Id. at ¶ 2.
48
Id.
42
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broadcast false information concerning a crime or a
catastrophe if:
(a) The licensee knows this information is false;
(b) It is foreseeable that broadcast of the
information will cause substantial public harm, and
(c) Broadcast of the information does in fact
directly cause substantial public harm.
Any programming accompanied by a disclaimer will be
presumed not to pose foreseeable harm if the disclaimer
clearly characterizes the program as a fiction and is
presented in a way that is reasonable under the
circumstances.49
A note to the rule states:
For purposes of this rule, “public harm” must begin
immediately, and cause direct and actual damage to
property or to the health or safety of the general public, or
diversion of law enforcement or other public health and
safety authorities from their duties. The public harm will be
deemed foreseeable if the licensee could expect with a
significant degree of certainty that public harm would
occur. A “crime” is any act or omission that makes the
offender subject to criminal punishment by law. A
“catastrophe” is a disaster or imminent disaster involving
violent or sudden event affecting the public.50
The broadcast hoax rule has four prongs. First, a station
must air false information concerning a crime or catastrophe.
Second, the station must know that the information is false. Third,
it must be foreseeable that broadcasting the false information will
cause substantial public harm. Fourth, the broadcast of the false
information must in fact cause immediate and substantial public
harm. All four prongs must be met for the rule to be violated.51
Each prong, and their application to the Free Press request, is
49

47 C.F.R. § 73.1217 (2019).
Id.
51
Id.
50
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considered next. However, the FCC has rarely considered possible
rule violations, and has never found a station to have violated the
rule.52 As a result, there is little case law on the broadcast hoax
rule, which makes it difficult “to predict for certain how it might
be applied to factual contexts.” 53
A. Prong 1: Airing False Information Concerning a Crime or
Catastrophe
The FCC decided to limit application of the rule to the
broadcast of false information concerning a crime or catastrophe.
With all four of the rule’s elements, the FCC sought to target the
rule narrowly to avoid infringing on broadcasters’ First
Amendment rights or chilling broadcast speech. 54 The limitation to
crimes or catastrophes was intended to limit the rule’s application
to the kinds of hoaxes that had historically caused the commission
the most concern, rather than harmless pranks such as the April
Fool’s Day joke that an NFL team’s star player had been traded. 55
This prong would then apply to many of the hoaxes that prompted
the FCC to adopt the rule, such as those involving a nuclear attack
warning, an erupting volcano, a shot station employee, and a
murder confession. 56
The COVID-19 pandemic would not seem to qualify as a
crime under the rule, but it might be considered a catastrophe, as
that term is generally understood. However, that does not mean it
would qualify as a catastrophe under the broadcast hoax rule. The
rule defines “catastrophe” as “a disaster or imminent disaster
involving [a] violent or sudden event affecting the public.”57 It
52

Justin Levine, A History and Analysis of the Federal Communications
Commission’s Response to Radio Broadcast Hoaxes, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 273,
310-11 (2000); Joel Timmer, Potential FCC Actions Against “Fake News”: The
News Distortion Policy and the Broadcast Hoax Rule, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1,
30-31 (2019).
53
Levine, supra note 52, at 311.
54
Broadcast Hoax Report & Order, supra note 37, ¶ 9.
55
Broadcast Hoax NPRM, supra note 42, ¶¶ 2-3.
56
Broadcast Hoax Report & Order, supra note 37, at n.1; Levine, supra
note 52, at 301-06.
57
Broadcast Hoax NPRM, supra note 42, ¶ 8 n.14.
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might be argued that the pandemic does not qualify as being
“violent” or “sudden” as required by the rule, and with the lack of
case law on the rule and its application, it is hard to know for
certain how this requirement might be interpreted. In its dismissal
of the Free Press petition, the FCC did refer to the pandemic as
“one of the most severe public health crises in a century” and as a
“national emergency.”58 Statements such as these could lend
support to the pandemic qualifying as a catastrophe under rule.
B. Prong 2: Knowing the Information to Be False
The second requirement of the broadcast hoax rule is that
the station “licensee must have known that the broadcast material
was false.”59 Here, the focus is not on whether Trump knew the
information was false. Rather, it is the broadcaster who airs
Trump’s statements that must know that the statements are false. In
addition to such knowledge by the station licensee, this
requirement could also be satisfied by “various employees of the
station, as well as corporate officials if the license holder is a
corporate entity” with such knowledge.60 Presumably, a
broadcaster that did not know whether the statements were
accurate or not would not satisfy this requirement, as it would not
know that the information was false.61
The FCC addressed this requirement’s application to
Trump’s statements in its dismissal of the Free Press emergency
petition. There it argued that:
a broadcaster’s decision to broadcast and comment on
statements made by the President, relating to one of the
most severe public health crises in a century, does not
amount to airing an intentional or knowing falsehood. . . At
this moment, broadcasters face the challenge of covering a
rapidly-evolving, national, and international health crisis, in
which new information—much of it medical or technical in
58
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nature and therefore difficult to corroborate or refute in real
time—is continually revealed, vetted, and verified or
dismissed. In addition, we note that the President and
members of the White House Coronavirus Task Force,
including public-health professionals, have held daily press
conferences in which they exhaustively answer critical
questions from the press. Under such circumstances, it is
implausible, if not absurd, to suggest that broadcasters
knowingly deceived the public by airing these press
conferences or other statements by the President about
COVID-19.62
In another context, the FCC was asked to determine
whether a TV station knowingly misled the public with a news
report on a drug that allegedly did not adequately highlight the
dangers of the drug. In a 2007 proceeding, the FCC considered the
accuracy of a TV news story on the safety of another drug,
synthetic bovine growth hormone (BGH), where it was alleged that
a TV station’s reporting on the drug failed to highlight the dangers
of the drug. 63 In that case, two reporters for Tampa, Florida TV
62

FCC Response, supra note 26, at 3.
TVT License, Inc., 22 FCC Rcd. 13,591, ¶ 4 (2007). This case involved
an alleged violation of the Commission’s news distortion policy, rather than the
broadcast hoax rule. Like the broadcast hoax rule, the news distortion policy has
four conditions that must be fulfilled for the policy to be violated. First, the
station must deliberately intend to distort the news or mislead the audience.
Second, there must be evidence, in addition to the news story itself, that the
station intended to mislead the audience. Third, station ownership or
management must initiate the distortion or know about it. Fourth, the public
must be deceived about a matter of some significance, rather than just an
incidental part of the news. See, e.g., Timmer, supra note 52, at 7-8. In contrast
to the broadcast hoax rule, the FCC’s news distortion policy does not allow the
Commission to fine stations that violate the policy. Rather, the policy is applied
only at a TV or radio station’s license renewal, which occurs for stations every
eight years. At that time, the FCC can consider whether a station has violated the
policy in determining whether the station should have its license renewed. See,
e.g., id. at 5-7. A detailed examination of the application of the news distortion
policy to the broadcast of false information related to COVID-19 is beyond the
scope of this article. However, given the similarities between the requirements
of the broadcast hoax rule and the news distortion policy, and the First
Amendment standards applicable to them, much of the analysis of the broadcast
63
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station WTVT prepared a report highlighting the dangers of BGH.
The station did not air that report, allegedly due to pressure on the
station from Monsanto, the company that produces BGH.64 The
station then aired a different report on the drug, which the original
reporters alleged was misleading in presenting evidence of the
safety of BGH. 65
The original reporters cited one statement in the final BGH
report as being “particularly troubling,” that being by “a Monsanto
spokesperson who stated during an interview that milk from cows
injected with BGH ‘is the same safe and wholesome product’ as
milk from cows not injected with BGH.”66 This, the reporters
argued, was not true.67 The reporters also claimed the final report
contained a number of other misleading statements about the safety
of BGH, and that the report failed to challenge certain statements
from a Monsanto representative interviewed for the story, in
particular “Monsanto’s assertion that ‘cancer experts don’t see a
problem’ with BGH.”68
The Commission was reluctant to make a determination
regarding the accuracy of the challenged report, stating it
“possesses ‘neither the expertise nor the desire to look over the
shoulder of broadcast journalists and inquire why a particular piece
of information was reported or not reported.”69 The FCC observed
that the safety of the drug “is a matter of considerable controversy
and scientific complexity.” The FCC pointed to the fact that the
use of BGH had been approved by the FDA, and that “the
American Medical Association (AMA), American Cancer Society,
and American Dietetic Association have issued statements
supporting its safety,” while other scientists and organization
believed BGH to be “a public health threat.”70
This led the FCC to conclude that: “[u]nder these
hoax rule would likewise apply to the news distortion policy.
64
TVT License, Inc., 22 FCC Rcd. 13,591, ¶¶ 2, 4.
65
Id. at ¶¶ 2, 4, 5.
66
Id. ¶ 4.
67
Id.
68
Id. ¶ 5 (citation omitted).
69
Id. ¶ 17 (citing In Re CIA, 58 Rad.Reg2d (P & F) 1544, 1549 (1985)).
70
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circumstances, the truth of the complained-of Monsanto statement
in the final BGH report that milk from BGH-injected cows is as
‘safe and wholesome’ as other milk … cannot be ‘readily and
definitively resolved.’”71 The Commission also stated that it would
not second-guess “the type of journalistic judgment embodied in
WTVT’s decision not to challenge certain Monsanto statements in
the report, including the assertion that ‘cancer experts don’t see a
problem’ with BGH use.”72 The FCC concluded that this was “a
legitimate editorial dispute” between the reporters and the station,
rather than a deliberate effort by the station to mislead the
audience.73 The FCC thus found there to be no wrongdoing by the
station here.
With respect to Trump’s claims about hydroxychloroquine,
it may be that, while there is some consensus that the drug should
not be taken to treat COVID-19, there may also be some evidence
to support Trump’s claim. In its response to the Free Press petition,
the FCC pointed to others that shared similar assessments to
Trump about the potential for the drug, including the FDA and
other medical professionals.74 The appropriate time to determine
knowledge about the falsity of the statement is the time that
broadcasters originally covered the statement. What might be
subsequently learned about the safety of the treatment is not
relevant to that determination. It may be that at the time of the
original coverage, the safety of using hydroxychloroquine and
chloroquine, like the safety of BGH in the WTVT case, could not
be “readily and definitely resolved.” Trump’s promotion of
disinfectants to treat the virus seems to be an easier case, as the
various parties that have weighed in on that issue have uniformly
warned against the dangers of such a course of treatment. 75 Thus, a
broadcaster reporting on Trump’s suggestion that disinfectants
could be used to treat COVID-19 with knowledge that that was a
dangerous treatment, without providing some disclaimer to that
effect, could satisfy this particular component of the broadcast
71

Id. (citations omitted).
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hoax rule.
C. Prong 3: Foreseeable that Broadcasting the False Information
Will Cause Substantial Public Harm
The third component of the broadcast hoax rule is that it
must be foreseeable that broadcast of the false information will
cause substantial public harm.76 This means that “the licensee
could expect with a significant degree of certainty that substantial
harm would occur.”77 Here, there is a presumption “that the public
will behave in a rational manner,”78 and the FCC will “not hold
broadcasters accountable for unreasonable or unpredictable public
conduct.”79 The FCC has said “that the nature of the broadcast will
be the single greatest determinant of foreseeability. Thus, the more
inherently unbelievable the broadcast, the more certain
broadcasters can be that substantial public harm is
unforeseeable.”80
Trump’s statements would most likely be covered by
broadcasters in news programming, a category of programming
that would seem to be on the far end of the spectrum away from
“inherently unbelievable.” However, it would be necessary to
examine the specific programs themselves, and the manner in
which the information was presented in the programs, to see if the
false statements were presented in a believable manner such that
the likelihood of harm is foreseeable. The other significant
question here is whether people who take hydroxychloroquine or
disinfectants because of broadcast coverage of Trump’s statements
about their potential effectiveness are acting rationally. If they are
considered to be acting rationally, then the harm is foreseeable. If
not, the harm would not be foreseeable.
The FCC addressed this issue in its response to the Free
Press petition, in the context of Free Press’ allegation that Trump’s
statements on hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine led an Arizona
76

47 C.F.R. § 73.1217 (2019).
Broadcast Hoax Report & Order, supra note 37, ¶ 13.
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man to take a similar drug, resulting in the man’s death. Stating
that: “this is not the kind of foreseeable harm contemplated by our
rules,” the FCC elaborated, “While these events are tragic, the
Presidential statements in question addressed the potential federal
approval and administration of hydroxychloroquine and
azithromycin by medical professionals. Under the circumstances, it
was not reasonably foreseeable that a broadcaster’s decision to air
this statement would result in viewers or listeners ingesting
cleaning products to protect themselves from COVID-19.” 81
This element may be the most difficult to establish with
regard to Trump’s inaccurate statements, even with regard to those
about the use of disinfectants to treat the virus. First, the FCC’s
just-quoted statement shows some inclination by the Commission
against finding people taking the substances Trump touts as being
potentially effective treatments for the disease as being
foreseeable. Further, people acting in such a manner—such as
ingesting or injecting disinfectants—are not acting rationally,
particularly since the products would likely contain warnings
against the dangers of so doing. As the FCC indicated, if the
public’s reaction is not rationale, then any harm that is caused
would not be deemed foreseeable as required by the rule.
D. Prong 4: Broadcast of the False Information Causes
Immediate and Substantial Public Harm
The final element of the rule requires that “the hoax must in
fact directly cause substantial public harm.” 82 This harm can take
various forms, including “damage to the health or safety of the
general public, diversion of law enforcement or other public health
or safety authorities from their duties, and damage to property. In
all cases, the public harm must be substantial. The public harm
must also begin immediately after the broadcast and result in actual
damage.”83 To be “immediate,” “the harm would have to occur
contemporaneously or shortly after the broadcast.”84 For there to
81
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be “actual damage,” “there must be injury in fact; the mere threat
of harm is not sufficient.” 85
The Commission included the requirement of substantial harm
“to exclude cases where the harm to the public may be real, but is
of such a minor nature that it does not offset the potential chilling
effect of a broader rule.” 86 However, the Commission declined to
specify how substantiality would be determined, preferring to
determine that based on the facts of each case. It did observe,
however, that hoaxes that “diverts local police and emergency
resources from their duties, causes widespread public disorder or
harms the health or safety of the general public, would most likely
inflict substantial public harm.”87 It contrasted this with hoaxes
that only resulted in a few members of the public contacting the
police or complaining to the station as unlikely to meet the
substantial public harm requirement.88
The harm allegedly caused by the broadcast of Trump’s
statement—the misuse of drugs or disinfectants—seems to be
substantial and actual public harm, in that misuse of these drugs
can lead to severe injury and even death. However, a question here
would be whether that harm was also “immediate,” as required by
the rule. Did people take these drugs “contemporaneously or
shortly after the broadcast”? How quickly would people need to
take the drugs to qualify as having done so “shortly after the
broadcast”? New York City’s Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene saw a rise in calls about the misuse of disinfectants within
18 hours of Trump’s remarks on their potential efficacy.89 Would
this qualify as immediate? Without precedent on these issues, it is
hard to know for certain. Nevertheless, it seems likely that there
would be some cases in which the harm was immediate, although
many others in which it would not. The severity of the harm
here—potential death—may be enough to fulfill this requirement
of the broadcast hoax rule.
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III. THE BROADCAST HOAX RULE IS A POOR FIT FOR THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES
Given the foregoing analysis, it does not seem likely that
broadcasters who air Trump’s inaccurate statements about
COVID-19 treatments without disclosing the inaccuracy of those
statements would be found in violation of the broadcast hoax rule.
There are several issues that may result in this situation failing to
meet all the narrowing requirements of the rule. For instance, is the
pandemic a “violent or sudden event affecting the public” as
required to qualify as a catastrophe under the rule? Was there some
basis at the time the statements were made and aired for believing
that these treatments might be effective, even if there were also a
significant amount of contradictory evidence, such that the FCC
would be unwilling to make a judgement on whether the
statements were actually false? Is it foreseeable that viewers and
listeners would take these drugs or disinfectants after broadcasters
aired Trump’s statements about them, and are people who do so
acting rationally? And did those who suffered harm from taking
the drugs or disinfectant as a result of broadcast coverage of
Trump’s statements take them contemporaneously with or shortly
after the broadcast, as required by the rule? All of these issues
make it doubtful that broadcasters have fulfilled all of the
requirements necessary to violate the broadcast hoax rule in these
circumstances. It appears the FCC acted properly in rejecting the
Free Press request to apply the broadcast hoax rule here.
Also supporting the conclusion that the FCC could not
properly apply the rule here is the fact that the rule allows
broadcasters a presumption against programming being deemed to
pose foreseeable harm when it is accompanied by a “disclaimer
that clearly characterizes the program as a fiction and is presented
in a way that is reasonable under the circumstances.”90 The false
“news reports” that led to the Commission’s adoption of the rule
were all fictional stories that originated with the stations
themselves, rather than accurate reports of a government official’s

90

47 C.F.R. § 73.1217 (2019).

50

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 15:3

statements on a matter of great public concern.91 All of this lends
support to the FCC’s observation that the Free Press request would
require it to apply the broadcast hoax rule in a “novel” and
“expand[ed] . . . construction of the rule,”92 one which
“misconstrue[d]” the rule.93 Thus, applying the broadcast hoax rule
in the manner urged by Free Press would greatly expand the rule
beyond the narrow sets of circumstances for which it was
designed, and to which it has been applied in the past.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES WITH MANDATED DISCLAIMERS
In addition to enforcement of its broadcast hoax rule, Free
Press also urged the Commission to “immediately issue an
emergency policy statement or enforcement guidance
recommending that broadcasters prominently disclose when
information they air is false or scientifically suspect. We
recommend that television disclosures appear in writing in the
lower third and orally, and that radio broadcasters correct
misinformation about COVID-19 in oral reporting after press
conferences and immediately following other instances when false
information airs.” 94
The FCC rejected this request as being
inconsistent with the First Amendment. Requiring such
disclosures would constitute compelled speech, and
‘recommending’ such disclosures through enforcement
guidance or a policy statement would constitute
government coercion by another name. . . [It would also]
improperly involve the federal government in making
editorial judgments about whether broadcasters had
accurately and sufficiently evaluated claims made by the
President and other government officials. Moreover,
pressuring broadcasters to air such disclosures would
impose significant burdens on them, burdens that could
91

See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying discussion.
FCC Response, supra note 26, at 3.
93
Id. at 1
94
Free Press Petition, supra note 6, at 7.
92

2020

NEWS REPORTING ON TRUMP’S COVID-19 TREATMENTS

51

chill news coverage at a time when information is one of
the only weapons the American public has to protect itself
from a contagious and deadly virus.95
The FCC’s analysis on this point appears to be correct.
Along with the First Amendment issues raised by the government
requiring broadcasters to provide specified speech, such a
requirement could cause a chilling effect, leading broadcasters to
actually reduce their coverage of the COVID-19 crisis for fear of
violating the FCC’s requirements, or for even having to defend
themselves in a proceeding to determine whether the rule was
violated.96 Furthermore, counterspeech can provide a less
restrictive and possibly more effective alternative to the
Commission’s requiring disclaimers in this context.97 Finally, such
disclaimers would be significantly underinclusive in preventing the
harm that Free Press intends to prevent. Each of these issues is
discussed in more detail below.98
The Supreme Court has observed that “Discussion of public
issues . . . [is] integral to the operation of the system of government
established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to such political expression in order ‘to assure
[the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people.’”99 Political
speech is provided this protection to allow the public to engage in
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate” on public issues.100
Significantly, this protection is not dependent on whether a
speaker’s claims are true or accurate.101
95
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The freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment
includes “the decision of both what to say and what not to say,”102
or, in other words, “both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all.”103 The Supreme Court has struck
down a number of government compelled speech requirements,
including one requiring New Hampshire motorists to display the
state motto “Live Free or Die” on their license plates,104 a North
Carolina requirement that professional fundraisers disclose to
potential donors the average percentage of gross receipts actually
turned over to charities by the fundraiser,105 and a West Virginia
requirement that all public school students and teacher salute the
American flag.106
Another compelled speech case is Miami Herald v.
Tornillo, in which the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality
of a compelled speech requirement for newspapers. s.107 That case
involved a Florida “right of reply” statute that gave “a political
candidate a right to equal space to reply to criticism and attacks on
his record by a newspaper…”108 Specifically, if a newspaper
attacked the personal character or official record of a political
567 U.S. 709, 734 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring). The FCC crafted the
broadcast hoax rule with several narrowing elements to avoid burdening
substantially more speech than necessary to achieve its goal. In fact, Justice
Breyer has cited the broadcast hoax rule as an example of a statute targeting
falsity that included narrowing elements. Id. at 735 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“Statutes prohibiting false claims of terrorist attacks, or other lies about the
commission of crimes or catastrophes, require proof that substantial public harm
be directly foreseeable, or, if not, involve false statements that are very likely to
bring about that harm.” See, e.g., 47 CFR § 73.1217 (2011) (requiring showing
of foreseeability and actual substantial harm).). For a detailed discussion of the
constitutionality of the broadcast hoax rule, see Timmer, supra note 50, at 4750.
102
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988).
103
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (citing W. Va. Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-634 (1943); id., at 645 (Murphy, J.,
concurring)).
104
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717.
105
Riley, 487 U.S. at 795-801.
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candidate, that candidate had “the right to demand that the
newspaper print, free of cost to the candidate, any reply the
candidate may make to the newspaper’s charges. The reply must
appear in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as
the charges which prompted the reply, provided it does not take up
more space than the charges. .”109
The Court viewed the right of reply requirement as
“operat[ing] as a command in the same sense as a statute or
regulation forbidding [a newspaper] to publish specified matter.”110
Given the consequences of a newspaper’s publication of any news
or commentary to which the statute might apply, the Court thought
that, “editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid
controversy. Therefore, under the operation of the Florida statute,
political and electoral coverage would be blunted or reduced.
Government-enforced right of access inescapably ‘dampens the
vigor and limits the variety of public debate.’”111
The Court also discussed how the law intruded on editors’
function:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit
for news, comment, and advertising. The choice of material
to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to
limitations on the size and content of the paper, and
treatment of public issues and public officials—whether
fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control
and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how
governmental regulation of this crucial process can be
exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a
free press as they have evolved to this time. .112
Finding the statute unconstitutional, the Court observed, “A
responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press
responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many
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other virtues it cannot be legislated.”113
Prior to its holding in Miami Herald, however, the Court
came to the opposite conclusion on a similar law that applied only
to broadcasters. That law was the fairness doctrine, which had two
requirements: (1) that broadcasters cover controversial issues of
public importance, and (2) that they cover opposing sides of those
issues.114 In Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, Reverend Billy James
Hargis, on a radio show on Pennsylvania station WGCB, attacked
author Fred J. Cook, saying “that Cook had been fired by a
newspaper for making false charges against city officials; that
Cook had then worked for a Communist-affiliated publication; that
he had defended Alger Hiss and attacked J. Edgar Hoover and the
Central Intelligence Agency; and that he had now written a ‘book
to smear and destroy Barry Goldwater.’”115 Upon learning of the
broadcast, Cook demanded that the station provide him with free
airtime to respond to the attack, which the station refused. The
FCC determined that the station “had failed to meet its obligation
under the fairness doctrine . . . to send a tape, transcript, or
summary of the broadcast to Cook and offer him reply time . . .”116
In ruling on the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine’s
right of reply requirement, the Court considered whether the
requirement would lead to a chilling effect, causing broadcasters to
reduce or eliminate their coverage of controversial public issues.117
The Court observed that, at the time, the FCC had indicated that
possibility was “at best speculative.”118 The Court also noted that
the broadcast networks had “taken pains to present controversial
issues in the past, and even now they do not assert that they intend
113
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to abandon their efforts in this regard.”119 Concluding that the
fairness doctrine had not had a chilling effect in the past, the Court
nevertheless indicated that “if experience with the administration
of these doctrines indicates that they have the net effect of
reducing rather than enhancing the volume and quality of
coverage, there will be time enough to reconsider the constitutional
implications.”120
The Court in Red Lion also discussed how the scarcity of
broadcast frequencies required a limitation on the number of TV
and radio stations, and how this in turn justified a lower level of
First Amendment protection for broadcasting, as opposed to other
forms of media, such as newspapers, which do not suffer from
such scarcity.121 Thus, due to differences in the forms of media to
which the two laws applied, and the implications of those
differences for the level of First Amendment protection accorded
those forms of media, the Court allowed a right of reply
requirement to stand for the broadcast media, while it found a
similar requirement in the print media to be unconstitutional.
Another significant reason why the Court allowed the requirement
to stand in Red Lion was because it did not see a chilling effect
resulting from it. Finally, and significantly, the Court indicated that
if it turned out that the requirement did cause a chilling effect, its
conclusion in Red Lion could be reconsidered.
As it turned out, the FCC later concluded that the fairness
doctrine did lead to a chilling effect, leading it to eliminate the rule
as being unconstitutional in 1987. Relying on a comprehensive
1985 FCC report on the fairness doctrine, the Commission
concluded that “the fairness doctrine ‘chills’ speech,”122 by
“thwart[ing] the purpose that it is designed to promote. Instead of
enhancing the discussion of controversial issues of public
importance … the fairness doctrine, in operation, ‘chills’
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speech.”123 Specifically, the Commission determined that the
fairness doctrine gave broadcasters
a powerful incentive not to air controversial issue
programming above that minimal amount required by the
first part of the doctrine [that broadcasters provide coverage
of controversial issues of public importance]. Each time a
broadcaster presents what may be construed as a
controversial issue of public importance, it runs the risk of
a complaint being filed, resulting in litigation and penalties,
including loss of license. This risk still exists even if a
broadcaster has met its obligations by airing contrasting
viewpoints [the second requirement of the fairness
doctrine], because the process necessarily involves a vague
standard, the application and meaning of which is hard to
predict. Therefore, by limiting the amount of controversial
issue programming to that required by the first prong (i.e.,
its obligation to cover controversial issues of vital
importance to the community), a licensee is able to lessen
the substantial burdens associated with the second prong of
the doctrine (i.e., its obligation to present contrasting
viewpoints) while conforming to the strict letter of its
regulatory obligations.124
Even broadcasters who believe they have presented
balanced coverage of controversial issues “may be inhibited by the
expenses of being second-guessed by the government in defending
a fairness doctrine complaint at the Commission, and if the case is
litigated in court, the costs of an appeal.”125 According the FCC,
this was “not merely speculative,” as the Commission had
compiled in its 1985 report “numerous instances in which the
broadcasters decided that it was ‘safer’ to avoid broadcasting
specific controversial issue programming, such as series prepared
for local news programs, than to incur the potentially burdensome
administrative, legal, personnel, and reputational costs of either
123
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complying with the doctrine or defending their editorial decisions
to governmental authorities.”126 This included stations refusing to
present editorials, not accepting political and public issue
advertisements, and not airing programming discussing
controversial issues.127
The FCC pointed out that the speech regulated by the
fairness doctrine—“opinions on controversial issues of public
importance”—was that “which the Framers of the Bill of Rights
were most anxious to protect—speech that is ‘indispensible to the
discovery and spread of political truth.’”128 The Commission went
on to observe “that the enforcement of the doctrine requires the
‘minute and subjective scrutiny of program content,’ which
perilously treads upon the editorial prerogatives of broadcast
journalists.”129 It also forced the Commission “to undertake the
dangerous task of evaluating particular viewpoints,” and “to
second-guess broadcasters’ judgment on the issues they cover, as
well as on the manner and balance of coverage.”130 The FCC
further pointed out that the “First Amendment was adopted to
protect the people not from journalists, but from government,”
giving “the people the right to receive ideas that are unfettered by
government interference.”131 It acknowledged that “[t]here is no
doubt that the electronic media is powerful and that broadcasters
can abuse their freedom of speech. But the framers of the
Constitution believed that the potential for abuse of private
freedoms posed far less a threat to democracy than the potential for
abuse by a government given the power to control the press.”132
All of this led the FCC to conclude that: “the fairness doctrine in
operation disserves both the public’s right to diverse sources of
information and the broadcaster’s interest in free expression. Its
chilling effect thwarts its intended purpose, and it results in
excessive and unnecessary government intervention into the
126
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editorial processes of broadcast journalists.”133 The FCC thus
found the Fairness Doctrine to violate the First Amendment and
eliminated the rule.134
Concern over such a chilling effect is a significant reason
why even false speech is protected by the First Amendment.135 As
the Supreme Court has observed, “some false statements are
inevitable if there is to be an open and vigorous expression of
views in public and private conversation, expression the First
Amendment seeks to guarantee.”136 The First Amendment protects
speech on political issues, both that which is true and that which
may not be, to promote the public’s ability to engage in
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate” on public issues.137
Punishing the press for covering false statements in these situations
might lead the press to avoid covering some statements on issues
of public concern, even though some or all might be true, out of
fear that some may turn out not be true and the station would risk
prosecution or punishment. Thus, “[t]he First Amendment requires
that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that
matters.”138
Allowing the press to escape punishment by proving the
statements to be true does not eliminate this chilling effect. News
organizations may still be concerned about the difficulty of
proving all aspects of their stories true in court, or even just about
the difficulties and expense of having to do so. This is a reason
why defendants in libel actions cannot be required to prove the
truth of their statements in order to escape liability; rather, the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the statement.139
133
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The Court offered this explanation for that requirement:
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee
the truth of all his factual assertions—and to do so on pain
of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount—leads to
a comparable “self-censorship.” Allowance of the defense
of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant,
does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. Even
courts accepting this defense as an adequate safeguard have
recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the
alleged libel was true in all its factual particulars. Under
such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be
deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is
believed to be true and even though it is in fact true,
because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear
of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only
statements which “steer far wider of the unlawful zone.”
The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of
public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.140
This same chilling effect could also result from requiring
broadcasters to provide disclaimers when covering false statements
made by Trump. First, such a requirement would force
broadcasters covering Trump’s statements about COVID-19
treatments to evaluate the accuracy of those statements while at the
same time covering an unfolding news story. Broadcasters who fail
to provide such disclaimers in these situations would risk being
investigated and sanctioned by the government. Even if the
broadcaster were to prevail in such an investigation, it would still
incur the time and expense of having to defend itself, and the
station’s reputation may be tarnished due to its being under
investigation by the FCC. In addition, it would put the FCC in the
position of having to determine which of Trump’s statements about
COVID-19 treatments are accurate and which are not. As with the
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86).
140
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (citations omitted).
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fairness doctrine, stations may decide to reduce or eliminate their
coverage of Trump’s statements to avoid the possibility of being
entangled this quagmire.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIMITATION TO BROADCAST MEDIA
Even if the FCC were to do as Free Press requested and
enforce the broadcast hoax rule and require broadcasters to air
disclaimers, this would have limited effectiveness in countering the
spread of false information, further undercutting the
constitutionality of these actions. As has been previously
discussed, that is because both rules apply only to broadcasters,
meaning TV and radio stations.141 The FCC could target stations
that air the newscasts of the big four broadcast networks: ABC,
CBS, NBC, and FOX,142 or the local newscasts of TV stations
themselves. Significantly, the broadcast hoax rule not apply to
cable news networks, newspapers, or websites.143 Of these three
major sources of news, the FCC only has authority over cable
networks, and its ability to regulate cable network speech is more
limited than with broadcast speech, as cable television is given
greater First Amendment protection than broadcasting.144
Thus, targeting broadcasters in the manner requested by
Free Press would address just a portion of the flow of
misinformation from Trump’s inaccurate statements—that coming
from broadcasters, but not that coming from cable news networks,
141
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newspapers, or websites. FCC enforcement of the rule would be of
limited effectiveness in reducing the harm stemming from the
misinformation, as any action against broadcasters would still
allow misinformation to flow from these other major sources of
news. This could further undermine the constitutionality of the
broadcast hoax rule or required disclosures, as these both could be
determined to be underinclusive in achieving their goal.
An example of the effect of under-inclusiveness on the
constitutionality of a law targeting potentially harmful speech is
provided by Brown v. Merchants Entertainment Association.145 In
that case, California passed a law prohibiting the sale or rental of
violent video games to minors.146 The state’s interest was to
prevent the harm violent video games allegedlycaused minors.147
However, California did not restrict minors’ access to other violent
media, such as Saturday morning cartoons or pictures of guns.148
As the Supreme Court saw it, “California has singled out the
purveyors of video games for disfavored treatment—at least when
compared to booksellers, cartoonists, and movie producers—and
has given no persuasive reason why.”149 To the Court, this made
the law “wildly underinclusive” in achieving its stated goal of
protecting minors from the harms believed to be associated with
their exposure to violent media, which, to the Court was enough
for the law to be found unconstitutional.150
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
So, how are we to handle Trump’s false statements and
seek to limit or eliminate the harm that might be caused by those
statements? Counterspeech–additional speech which refutes the
false statements—is the preferred remedy. As the Court has stated,
“The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true. This is
145

564 U.S. 786 (2011).
Id. at 789 (citations omitted).
147
Id. at 799-801.
148
Id. at 801-02.
149
Id. at 802.
150
Id. at 801-02 (citing City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994);
Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989)).
146

62

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 15:3

the ordinary course in a free society. The response to the
unreasoned is the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to
the straight-out lie, the simple truth.”151 The Free Press request
would require that broadcasters provide this counterspeech along
with their coverage of the statements themselves. However, this is
government-mandated speech, which, as has been discussed, raises
significant First Amendment concerns.
The First Amendment is grounded on the theory “that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market.”152 Thus, rather than allowing the
government to restrict or punish false statements, we depend on the
marketplace of ideas to help us sort the true from the false. We
allow both true ideas and false ideas to compete in this
marketplace. Under this view, the best weapon against false speech
is speech that is true. Counterspeech, accurate information which
counters the false, is preferred as a remedy to government
action.153
In its denial of the Free Press petition, the FCC echoed this
view. The commission concluded:
[T]he antidote to the alleged harms raised by Free Press
is—ironically enough—a free press. The rapid and
comprehensive coverage of the present pandemic, free from
burdensome disclaimers, agency investigation, or other
government oversight, advances the public interest in
maximizing information flow, while facilitating the vetting
of statements by public officials via the ordinary
journalistic process.”154
The FCC thus chose to “leave to the press its time-honored and
constitutionally protected role in testing the claims made by our
151
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political leaders,”155 and to trust “the American public’s ability to
differentiate between medical advice and political opinion.”156
While not a perfect solution, reliance on the marketplace of
ideas to sort accurate from inaccurate information about COVID19 and its effects is better than doing so through FCC enforcement
of the broadcast hoax rule against stations who report on Trump’s
inaccurate statements without labeling them so, or through FCC
requiring to accompany such reporting with disclaimers. These
actions could very well have the opposite of the intended effect,
instead leaving the public with less information about COVID-19
due to broadcasters deciding to limit or forego such coverage
instead of risking investigation and potential sanction by the FCC.
The philosophy of the First Amendment is that we allow the truth
of these matters to come to light through the competition in the
marketplace of ideas. While the marketplace of ideas may often
function less than perfectly, this is to be preferred over the
government telling the press what it cannot say, or what it must
say.
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